Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Recent Federal Employee Title VII Opinion



            Tahar Ahmed has been employed as an Immigration Enforcement Agent for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) since 2003.  In 2009, Ahmed applied for the position of Deportation Officer.  Ahmed was notified on October 1 that he was not selected for the position.  Ahmed brought an employment discrimination action against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security alleging that he was denied the position of Deportation Officer based on his religion, race, and national origin: a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
            The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, held that a reasonable jury would find that Ahmed was a victim of discrimination based on one of more of his minority characteristics.  Title VII prohibits an employer to discriminate against an employee solely based on his/her religion, race, and national origin.  The court explained that Ahmed provided sufficient evidence that showed a pattern of bypassing minorities for promotion in the Boston ICE office.  Based on the historical evidence offered by Ahmed that there was a complete absence of black and Arab Deportation Officers, and Hispanics felt discouraged about applying for promotions, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.  Ahmed v. Johnson, 13-1054, WL 2111236 (1st Cir. May 21, 2014).

Sunday, July 6, 2014

Free Speech Rights



            Sean P. Smith was employed as an assistant district attorney (“ADA”) for the Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, District Attorney’s office from 2004 through July 2010.  In 2010 Smith met with the district attorney, Pete Gilchrist, to announce his decision to run for the office of Mecklenburg County district court judge.  While Smith was still employed as an ADA, he gave an interview to the Charlotte FOX television affiliate to discuss his concerns with the Charlotte defensive-driving course.  After voicing his concerns about the driving course, Smith was asked were there any other policies within the DA’s that he disagreed with: Smith refused to comment.

            The next day Gilchrist terminated Smith and failed to provide Smith with any reason for the termination.  Smith brought an action in federal district court seeking money damages against Gilchrist as an elected government official.  Smith also claimed that he was terminated as a result of the interview and the termination was a violation of his free-speech rights under the US and NC constitutions.  The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, held that Smith’s speech was protected under the First Amendment and Smith could not be fired for making the statements he made unless his right to speak was outweighed by the district attorney’s legitimate interests.  The court explained that the First Amendment protects speech as well as “the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the exercise of that right.”

            Under the First Amendment a district attorney running for public office has the right to speak publicly, as a candidate, on matters of public concern.  Based on this reasoning. the court reversed the lower court’s order granting summary judgment against Smith and remanded to the district court for trial.  Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2014).

Tuesday, July 1, 2014

Chick-fil-A Pregnancy Discrimination Settlement



On June 5, 2014, the Charlotte District Office of the EEOC (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) announced that a Concord, N.C. Chick-fil-A has agreed to pay $10,000 and provide substantial injunctive relief to settle the pregnancy discrimination lawsuit that was filed against the franchise in 2013.  In 2012, John Charping, the owner, interviewed Heather Morrison for a team member position.  During the interview Morrison was six months pregnant, and was asked a series of pregnancy related questions.  Three days after the interview Morrison was informed that she would not be hired, and to call back after she had the baby and appropriate childcare. The EEOC filed a lawsuit against this Chick-fil-A alleging that Morrison did not receive the position as a result of her pregnancy.  Equal Employment Opportunity Commision v. John Charping d/b/a Chick-fil-A.

            Refusing to hire an applicant, or discriminating against a current employee, due to pregnancy is unlawful pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.  The PDA, which was an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, was enacted to prohibit discrimination against women on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and/or related medical conditions.  In addition to the monetary relief to Morrison, the company entered into a two-year consent decree that requires the company to implement a policy that prohibits pregnancy-based discrimination, as well as annual training on pregnancy discrimination for employees, supervisors and managers.  The company is also required to report to the EEOC all job openings that come available during the next two years, along with any pregnant applicants.


Saturday, March 16, 2013

Hostility Toward Accommodation Shows Bias


The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) requires that an employer provides their qualified employees with disabilities any reasonable accommodations, unless doing so would cause the employer undue hardship. That accommodation could be any " any change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities." Refusal to accommodate an employee, or terminating them for requesting an accommodation, can allow employees to bring a claim against their employer for an ADA violation. Termination based on pretext can also give rise to a valid claim for an ADA violation. Pretext occurs when an employer formulates a legitimate reason for termination, but the underlying and true reason was discriminatory. A way to establish pretext is to show that discriminatory comments were made by the key decision maker or those in a position to influence the decision maker.
 
In a recent case, Kelley v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., Kelley (the employee) shattered her pelvis while horseback riding. (Click click to access the case) She required surgery, and took a leave of absence for six weeks. Upon her return, Kelley was under several medical restrictions which included using crutches for ambulation, not using her hands for lifting, and keeping squatting to a minimum. Kelley could lift, push, and pull objects as long as she remained seated. When she began to use a cane at work, her supervisor told her she was not allowed to do so without a proper doctor's note. In response, Kelley acquired the note. That was not the first time that her supervisor made it difficult for her to work after her injury and had often suggested that Kelley "was misrepresenting the extent of her injuries and that she would be unable to walk if she had truly fractured her pelvis." That was further affirmed when a member of management alerted Kelley that the supervisor had said she "wanted her gone."
 
On the night shift of October 17, 2008, Kelley was on vacation but was called in to work. She came in only to realize that her assignment was changed to the main clinic. The main clinic responded to "code blues" which required quick response time, and the lifting of stretchers. Unfamiliar with the responsibilities of the main clinic, and also wary of taking on the physical responsibility with her disability, she asked another nurse to switch with her. The nurse initially agreed, but then refused. The supervisor was soon called to resolve the issue between Kelley and the other nurse via speakerphone. After the conversation, Kelley was escorted off the premises by security per instruction of the supervisor who claimed that refusing to take the assignment qualified as insubordination. A written recommendation was submitted by the supervisor to her superiors, stating that Kelley should be fired for insubordination. They agreed and fired Kelley.
 
The court found the evidence to clearly establish that Kelley and her supervisor had a tense work relationship and often disagreed on her need for accommodations. Her supervisor was also repeatedly hostile towards any accommodation. The court stated that this behavior was "probative of a pretextual ground for terminating Kelley's employment." Her supervisors comments went beyond mere remarks or comments and were actually discriminatory. The night of October 17 could be views as "the culmination of this history of disability-based conflict." The termination of Kelley was not because she was insubordinate, but rather due to her supervisor using a convenient excuse to rid herself of an employee she thought to be annoying. The court stated that an employer cannot use insubordination to mask retaliation for requesting a reasonable accommodation and vacated the finding of summary judgment in favor of the employee. The case has been remanded.

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Harassment Based On National Origin


The EEOC defines national origin discrimination as discrimination that "involves treating people (applicants or employees) unfavorably because they are from a particular country or part of the world, because of ethnicity or accent, or because they appear to be of a certain ethnic background (even if they are not)." Harassment, which is a form of unlawful discrimination, based on national origin is unlawful when it is "so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or offensive work environment or when it results in an adverse employment decision (such as the victim being fired or demoted)." This is enforced under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 
In a recent case from the First Circuit, Zayadeen v. Abbott Molecular Inc. (click here for access), the Court determined that an employee was able to bring a claim for racial and national origin discrimination against his employer. Zayadeen was born in Jordan and of Arab descent. His fellow employees, including one who later was promoted to a supervisory position, frequently called him "Borat" based on the film of the same name. Other employees were also encouraged to call Zayadeen by the name "Borat" as well. The name calling occurred in public, and in the presence of at least one employee from the Human Resources Department.
 
Other isolated incidents included being told: "Well, I don't want to be sitting home watching the news and I see you stuck to the front of an Israeli tank;" and "We let you in this country, and we gave you a Green Card. The least you can do is speak English." Zayadeen was also told that the Arabic language was a "dirty language" and that his Jordanian food looked like dog food. Although Zayadeen never complained directly to his supervisors, he did ask the employees to cease the name calling. A supervisor overheard this and took no steps to stop it or prevent it.
 
In June 2009, Zayadeen took an approved personal leave of absence from July 13, 2009 through November 15, 2009. His supervisor stated that he needed to fill that position immediately, and began the process of posting the position before Zayadeen went on leave. When Zayadeen tried to return towards the end of August, he was told his position was no longer available. However, a replacement was not hired until two days prior to Zaydeen's leave of absence being up and did not begin to work until the end of December. Zayadeen extended his leave for a total of one year, and was officially separated from the company when his leave expired.
 
Based on the evidence, the court determined that:
(1) A reasonable jury could conclude that Zayadeen was harassed based on his Jordanian national origin.
(2) A reasonable jury could also conclude that Zayadeen was harassed because of his Arab descent.
(3) A jury could reasonably conclude that routinely being so ridiculed, mostly in the presence of co-workers and superiors, altered the conditions of Zayadeen's employment.
(4) A reasonable jury could infer that because the supervisor who granted Zayadeen's leave had previously harassed him on account of his race and national origin, the supervisor was motivated by those same discriminatory impulses when deciding whether Zayadeen could return to his job.
 
The case will now be proceeding to trial.

Monday, March 11, 2013

Parents Allowed FMLA Leave For Adult Children



The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) issued an administrator's interpretation which clarified "the definition of 'son or daughter' under Section 101(12) of the Family and Medical Leave Act" (FMLA). (Click here for access.) The FMLA entitles eligible employees to 12 work weeks of unpaid, job protected leave to care for children with a serious health condition, either under 18 years of age or over 18 and unable to care for themselves due to a mental or physical disability. A parent caring for a seriously injured or ill military service-member is entitled to 26 work weeks of FMLA leave. The WHD interpretation clarifies that a parent caring for a service-member may take leave for subsequent years as well, since their injuries may last longer than a 12-month period.

There are four requirements that must be met in order for a parent to be entitled to take leave to care for a child. Those four requirements are that the child (1) have a disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, (2) be incapable of caring for him or herself due to that disability, (3) have a serious health condition, and (4) be in need of care because of that serious health condition. The WHD has made it clear that the age of the onset of a disability is irrelevant in the determination of a parent's entitlement to FMLA protected leave. The WHD looked to the purpose of the FMLA, WHD’s enforcement experience, and the example in the preamble to the 2008 FMLA Final Rule. This conclusion was also drawn by looking at the legislative history of the FMLA, which supported the contention that "Congress recognized that a disabled child’s need for care from a parent may not end when the child reaches the age of 18." Their reasoning for that conclusion was "that adults who are unable to care for themselves because of a disability have 'the same compelling need for parental care' as children under the age of 18."

To learn more about your rights to leave under the FMLA, visit the Department of Labor's website: http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/

Friday, March 8, 2013

EEOC Strategic Enforcement Plan 2013



In December, the EEOC approved a Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) for 2013 which established national priorities, and integrated all the components of EEOC's private, public and federal sector enforcement. It is a targeted approach by focusing on specific priorities,  and an integrated approach by using all of the EEOC's resources and staff to collaboratively achieve their goal of reducing discrimination in the workplace. The SEP will also hold the Commission, General Counsel, agency leadership, and agency staff accountable for following through with the expectations set forth in the document.

The six priorities established were: (1) eliminating barriers in recruitment and hiring; (2) protecting immigrant, migrant and other vulnerable workers; (3) addressing emerging and developing issues; (4) enforcing equal pay laws; (5) preserving access to the legal system; and (6) preventing harassment through systemic enforcement and targeted outreach. The SEP focuses its attention on eliminating discriminatory practices in the workplace. It is no secret that there are certain employers who discriminate in their hiring practices, and have been able to conceal these practices from the public. Hopefully, the SEP will encourage employers to re-evaluate their hiring criteria in order to avoid discrimination claims being brought up against them. Despite having a new plan, the EEOC will also continue to utilize previous plans and meet the commitments set forth in those plans. The 2013 SEP will have a comprehensive approach, encompassing old and new principles in order to afford more protection to the workers of this nation. 

For access to the entire Strategic Enforcement Plan, click here.